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What  makes  workers  consider  it  fair  for  wages  to  be  indexed  on  job  performance  or 
efficiency? In this paper we attempt to answer this question using the 2005 wave of the 
World Values Survey data for 43 countries to investigate what socio-economic characteristics 
condition employees’ preference for efficiency over equity wages. Our results suggest that 
employees’ preference for efficiency wages increases with education and globalization while 
it  decreases  with  unemployment,  income  inequality  and  income  tax  rates.  Given  that 
conventional  economic  theory  demonstrates  the  importance  of  labour  efficiency,  which 
improves when workers are remunerated according to their efficiency, for economic growth; 
our results suggest that institutions and specifically public policies that promote education, 
and  globalization,  along  with  policies  that  reduce  unemployment,  income  inequality  and 
income tax rates could be used to promote efficiency-based wages. 
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The efficiency–equity trade-off is at the core of policy debates in mainstream economics. 
One particular area where this trade-off is evident is in the labour wage policies. Whereas 
horizontal equity within the labour market would require workers on the same job to receive 
equal  pay  independent  of  performance,  allocative  efficiency,  on  the  other  hand,  requires 
workers at the margin to receive a wage equal to their value product. Therefore, for the labour 
market to operate efficiently, efficiency wage theories suggest wages should be based on 
labour productivity and performance (Stiglitz, 1974; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984 and Akerlof 
and Yellen, 1990). Since firms’ objective is to maximize profits given labour costs and other 
constraints, efficient workers or high performing workers will boost the firms’ productivity 
and  profit  and  this  in  turn  will  promote  the  country’s  economic  growth.  Subsequently, 
efficiency driven labour market reforms have been central to economic liberalization reforms 
aimed at stimulating economic growth. For instance, in 1984, in order to improve economic 
growth,  China  instituted  labour  market  reforms  that  exhibited  a  significant  shift  from 
socialist/egalitarian horizontal wages towards a wage policy that aims to strengthen the link 
between individual remuneration, individual productivity and enterprise performance (Coady 
and Wang, 2000).   
Efficiency wage theories stem from the notion that productivity is dependent on workers’ 
effort and postulate that workers should be compensated for their induced effort with higher 
wages  paid  to  employees  who  exert  better  performance.  Four  distinct  microeconomic 
foundations justify the relationship between wages and productivity (Yellen, 1984). First, in 
developing  countries higher wages can increase  worker’s  food consumption,  and thereby 
cause them to be better nourished and more productive. Second, higher wages can increase 
workers’ effort in  situations where moral  hazard problems exist as firms cannot monitor 
worker  performance  perfectly.  In  support  of  this,  Akerlof  and  Yellen  (1990)  argue  that 
workers proportionately withdraw effort as their actual wage falls short of their fair/efficient 
wage, therefore, remunerating workers based on their productivity will provide the incentive 
to work rather than shirk. A similar line of reasoning was advanced by Shapiro and Stiglitz 
(1984). Third, adverse selection yields further reason for a relationship between productivity 
and wages. Assuming that job performance depends on workers’ ability and since workers 
are  likely  to  be  heterogeneous,  if  ability  and  workers’  reservation  wages  are  positively 
correlated, then firms with higher wages will attract more competent job candidates (James 
Malcolmson, 1981). Finally, firms may also offer efficiency wages to reduce costly labour  
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turnover (Stiglitz, 1974; Gottfries and Westermark, 1998). Efficiency wages, in as far as they 
are set above market clearing wages, can enhance loyalty among workers and hence induce 
high effort. Conversely, wages set below the market clearing rate can lead to labour turnover 
and/or shirking. 
Intuitively, a firm has to decide whether to index wages on workers’ efficiency or to have 
equal horizontal wages. This poses significant challenges as in most cases choosing one wage 
policy sacrifices the other. Moreover, the sustainability of wage policies hinges to a large 
extent on whether or not the employees perceive them as fair. This means that it is important 
to  understand  which  socio-economic  as  well  as  country-specific  characteristics  influence 
employees’ valuation of wage policies in terms of fairness. To our knowledge, no one has 
investigated what factors condition workers’ preferences for efficiency versus equity wages. 
Such an investigation is merited, not only due to the importance of incentive mechanisms in 
labour productivity, but it could also guide employers on designing wage structures for their 
firms. 
Thus, the objective of this paper is to investigate the socio-economic factors as well as 
macro-level  policy  variables  that  influence  employees’  preferences  for  efficiency-based 
wages  rather  than  horizontal egalitarian  pay  systems.  Our  analysis  is  based  on the  2005 
World Value Surveys (WVS) data on employed individuals. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 presents the econometric framework 
and data used in the empirical estimation while the presentation and discussion of results is 
done in section 3. We conclude in section 4. 
2.  The Empirical model and data 
This section briefly outlines the econometric framework as well as the data used in the 
analysis. 
2.1  The Empirical model 
What  makes  an  individual  consider  it  fair  for  workers  to  be  paid  according  to  their 
performance or efficiency? Conversely, what factors make employees have a preference for 
equal horizontal pay? Specifically, how does the probability that a worker prefers efficiency 
over equity wages vary with socioeconomic characteristics? In line with this, the objective of 
the  empirical  analysis  is  to  examine  different  socio-economic  as  well  as  country-level 
characteristics that condition employee’s preference for efficiency wages relative to equity  
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wages. Accordingly, we model the probability that an employee believes that wages should 
be indexed on job efficiency as follows  
i i 0 1 i
i i 0 1 i
P(Efficiency wages 1 ) ( , , );







.      (1) 
Assuming this probability is a linear combination of the worker’s observed and unobserved 
socio-economic characteristics as well as country-specific characteristics then the following 
empirical model is estimated 
i 0 1 i i Efficiency wages α ε = + + α X ,        (2) 
for i 1,.....,N =  workers. The dependent variable  i Efficiency wages  is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the respondent believes it is fair to base wages on efficiency and zero 
otherwise. It is formulated based on the following question from the World Values Survey 
questionnaire: Imagine two secretaries, of the same age, doing practically the same job. One 
finds out that the other earns considerably more than she does. The better paid secretary, 
however, is quicker, more efficient and more reliable at her job. In your opinion, is it fair or 
not fair that one secretary is paid more than the other?  
This  question  asks  the  respondent  to  make  efficiency  and  equity  considerations  with 
reference to wages. As the question indicates, efficiency is with regards to being efficient on 
the job and can be interpreted as relating to productive efficiency. Thus, if a respondent says 
it  is  fair  to  pay  the  ‘quicker,  more  efficient and  more  reliable’  secretary  more,  then  the 
respondent expresses the belief that wages should reward good performance. On the other 
hand, if the respondent says that it is unfair to have one secretary paid more than the other we 
consider the respondent as believing in equal horizontal pay i.e. he or she believes workers 
should be paid the same regardless  of the differences  in performance. This allows us to 
interpret the question as asking the respondent to state their preference between efficiency 
and equity wages. 
The  vector  i X   comprises  socio-economic  characteristics  of  the  respondent  as  well  as 
country-specific  characteristics.  Inclusion  of  these  characteristics  is  based  on  existing 
empirical literature and theory. The parameter and the vector of parameters to be estimated 
are  0 α  and  1 α  respectively. The error term,  i ε  is assumed to be independently, identically, 
and normally distributed with zero mean and standard deviation equal to one (Wooldridge,  
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2002).  The  cumulative  distribution  function  of  the  error  terms  is  denoted  byΦ .  The 
assumption of the normality of the error terms and the binary nature of the dependent variable 
means that equation (2) can be estimated using the probit model (see Wooldridge, 2002 for 
more details on the probit model). 
2.2  Data and descriptive statistics 
The individual-level data used in this paper is from the 2005 wave of the World Value 
Surveys  (WVS).  The  data  consists  of  60579  observations  from  43  countries
1.  Since  our 
interest is on the workers’ preference for efficiency wages, the analysis is confined only to 
employed individuals in the sample -a total of 31108 observations.  The paper utilizes the 
data to investigate the socio-economic factors that influence workers’ preference between 
efficiency and equity wages. To control for macro or country-specific effects on workers’ 
preferences we augment the socio-economic variables from the WVS data by country-level 
data on GDP per capita, globalization indices, unemployment rates, income inequalities and 
income tax rates.
2  
Table  1  below  gives  descriptive  and  summary  statistics  of  the  variables  used  in  our 
empirical analysis.  Around 79% of the respondents believe that it is fair to pay higher wages 
to more efficient workers. On average the surveyed respondent has completed secondary 
schooling (the mean for education level is 5.5) and around 67% of the respondents consider 
themselves religious. 75% of the respondents are employed in the private sector while the rest 
are employed in the public sector. The mean of the income deciles reported by the surveyed 
households is 5. Interestingly, on average respondents believe that competition is good as it 
stimulates hard work and development of new ideas. 
Regarding the country-specific variables, the average GDP per capita is around 12800 in 
PPP (current international dollars) and an average unemployment rate of 9.8% is recorded for 
                                                              
1 Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Chile, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, 
Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Italy,  Japan,  Jordan,  Malaysia,  Mali,  Mexico,  Moldova,  Morocco,  Peru, 
Poland, Romania, Rwanda, South Africa, South Korea, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United States of America, Vietnam and Zambia. 
2 Data on GDP per capita and unemployment rates is obtained from the World Development Indicators online 
database for 2005. The overall globalization index is obtained from the Centre for the Study of Globalization 
and Regionalization (CSGR) at Warwick University, UK http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/research/ The 
overall Globalization Index is a normalized index based on economic, social, and political sub-indices that 
allows cross-country comparison of the degree of integration in the global economy over time. We have used 
the  maximum  individual  income  tax  rate  levied  in  the  country  and  obtained  the  data  from  the  complete 
Worldwide Tax & Finance Site (http://www.worldwide-tax.com/). We used the Gini Coefficient as a measure of 
income inequality and data on Gini is obtained from Human Development Report (2007/8) UNDP  
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the countries in the sample. The level of income inequality as reflected by the Gini coefficient 
is 40. The average globalization index is 0.47 indicating that on average, countries in the 
sample enjoy some levels of global interaction, integration and interdependence with regards 
to economic, social and political spheres. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable  Description  Mean  Std. 
Deviation 
Dependent variable 
Efficiency wages  1 if respondent  believes it is fair to reward efficiency on the 
job, 0 otherwise 
0.79  0.41 
Socioeconomic characteristics 
Education
3  Highest education level attained by the respondent   5.51  2.50 
Gender  Sex of the respondent (1=male and 0=female)  0.58  0.49 
Age  Age of the respondent  39.60  12.32 
Married  1 if respondent is married or living together with a partner, 0 
otherwise 
0.68  0.46 
Income
4  Income scale of the household  5.00  2.20 
Public sector  1 if respondent is employed in the public sector, 0 otherwise  0.25  0.43 
Private sector  1 if respondent is employed in the private sector, 0 
otherwise. Used as a reference variable. 
0.75  0.43 
Competition
5  Whether competition is good or harmful  3.76  2.44 
Religious  1 if respondent considers him/herself religious, 0 otherwise  0.67  0.47 
Black  1 if respondent is Black, 0 otherwise  0.18  0.38 
White  1 if respondent is White, 0 otherwise  0.34  0.47 
Asian  1 if respondent is Asian, 0 otherwise  0.20  0.40 
Other ethnicities  1 if respondent is from another ethnicity, 0 otherwise. Used 
as a reference ethnicity variable. 
0.28  0.45 
Country level variables and continental dummies 
GDP  GDP per capita/1000, in PPP (current international $)  12.84  11.65 
Unemployment rate  Unemployment, total (% of total labour force)  9.78  8.30 
Gini
6  Gini coefficient, a measure of income inequality   40.28  10.11 
Globalization
7  Overall globalization index (2004)  0.47  0.18 
Tax  Maximum individual income tax rate (Percent)  32.75  11.51 
 
                                                              
3 This is categorized as follows: 1=No formal education, 2=Incomplete primary school, 3=Complete primary 
school,  4=Incomplete  secondary  school:  technical/vocational  type,  5=Complete  secondary  school: 
technical/vocational  type,  6=Incomplete  secondary:  university-preparatory  type,  7=  Complete  secondary: 
university-preparatory type, 8=Some university-level education, without degree, 9=University-level education, 
with degree. 
4 The scale is from 1 to 10 where 1= “lowest income decile” and 10 = “highest income decile in the country”. 
5 The scale is from 1 to 10 where 1= “competition is good” and 10 = “competition is harmful”. 
6 The Gini Coefficient for the sampled countries ranges from 24.9 (Japan) to 60.7 (Brazil). A lower value 
indicates less income inequality.  
7 A higher value of the index indicates that a country is more integrated in the global economy; zero implies no 
integration and one indicates full integration.  
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3. Results and Discussion 
Table 2 below presents the results from a probit estimation of equation (2). The estimation 
is done in two steps: First, we estimate the model based on the individual-level data drawn 
from  the  WVS  data  only  (model  (1)  in  Table  2)  followed  by  a  second  estimation  that 
augments the employed individual-level data with country-level data (model (2) in Table 2). 
The rationale underlying our strategy is not only to ensure robustness of the results but also to 
allow  for  the  possibility  that  country-specific  effects  might  influence  respondents’ 
perceptions of efficiency and equity wages. The dependent variable in both estimations is 
Efficiency wages i.e. whether the respondent thinks it is fair to index wages on efficiency or 
performance, or whether wages should be equal regardless of the efficiency of the worker. As 
mentioned earlier, the analysis is confined to individuals that were employed at the time the 
survey was conducted.  
The discussion of results is based on the second model (model (2)) which has the advantage 
of  controlling  for  country-level  variables.  Results  show  that  the  estimated  education 
coefficient is positive and significant; indicating that more educated employees consider it 
fair to index wages on job performance or efficiency . This is further confirmed by table 3 
below  where we  report the predicted probability that  workers  prefer efficiency to equity 
wages for a given level of education, holding the rest of the variables constant at their means. 
The table reveals that the probability of preferring efficiency wages clearly increases with 
advancement in education. A possible explanation for this result is that while the dependent 
variable in the analysis is a self-reported preference for efficiency-wages, the response could 
be a reflection of whether or not the individual perceives themselves as efficient on their job. 
If this is the case then the result is consistent with existing literature that has demonstrated 
how education improves efficiency of workers which is normally reflected in higher wages 





Table 2: Probit estimation of Efficiency wages 
   (1)  (2) 
Variables  Coeff.  Robust Std. Error  Coeff.  Robust Std. Error 
Socioeconomic characteristics 
Education  0.040***  0.004  0.041***  0.005 
Gender  0.060***  0.019  0.060***  0.021 
Age  0.004***  0.001  0.004***  0.001 
Married  0.057***  0.021  0.040*  0.023 
Income  0.028***  0.005  0.031***  0.005 
Religious  0.012  0.021  0.011  0.025 
Black  -0.389***  0.027  -0.304***  0.038 
White  0.023  0.024  -0.098***  0.031 
Asian  0.067**  0.029  -0.042  0.039 
Public sector  -0.021  0.023  -0.021  0.025 
Competition  -0.063***  0.004  -0.055***  0.004 
Country-level variables 
GDP      -0.011***  0.002 
Tax      -0.003*  0.001 
Gini      -0.017***  0.002 
Unemployment rate      -0.011***  0.002 
Globalization      0.299***  0.092 
Constant  0.555***  0.053  1.358***  0.114 
Wald chi2  1000.37  1081.63 
Log pseudolikelihood  -11841.00  -9793.62 
Overall correct predictions (%)  79  79 
Observations  24754  20856 
   Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Specification (2) controls for 
continental dummies. 
Table 3: Illustration of how the probability that workers prefer efficiency over equity wages 
changes with education 
Education Level  Probability (Efficiency wages=1) 
   
No Education  0.75 
Incomplete Primary  0.77 
Complete Primary  0 .78 
Incomplete Vocational  0 .79 
Complete Vocational  0 .80 
Incomplete Secondary  0 .81 
Complete Secondary  0 .82 
Incomplete University  0 .83 




Another finding is that conditional on the other factors, preference for efficiency wages 
increases with age. Age is usually taken as a proxy for work experience, which has also been 
found to enhance job performance. It could be that when answering the questions respondents 
who perceive themselves as more efficient due to experience prefer efficiency wages. This is 
consistent with Vegard (2003) who finds that older individuals’ maintain a relatively high 
productivity level, especially in jobs where experience is important. 
One  of  the  underlying  aims  of  globalization  is  to  increase  efficiency  hence  it  is  not 
surprising that globalization has a positive impact on employees’ preference for efficiency 
over equity wages as confirmed by our results in tables 2 and 4. Globalization emphasizes 
profit  maximization  as  well  as  firms’  competitiveness  in  the  global  economy.  It  is  also 
expected  that  all  countries  pursue  a  common  set  of  economic  policies  which  foster  free 
markets and efficiency values. This implies that globalization might influence workers’ to put 
more emphasis on efficiency as opposed to equity. 
Table 4: Illustration of how the probability that workers prefer efficiency over equity wages 
changes with the globalization index 
Globalization  Probability (Efficiency wages=1) 
   
Globalization =0  0 .77 
Globalization =0.25  0 .79 
Globalization =0.50  0 .81 
Globalization =0.75  0 .83 
Globalization =1  0 .85 
 
Men  favor  compensation  for  efficiency  while  women  prefer  equal  horizontal  wages, 
independent of effort.  This result is consistent with empirical literature that examines gender 
differences in self-reported distributive justice preferences in work organizations which has 
found significant differences in the ways that men and women allocate monetary rewards to 
themselves and/or between themselves and others after performing some task (Kahn, et al., 
1980). Women are also found to allocate fewer rewards to themselves and more to their 
coworkers as compared to men with equivalent inputs (Major, Bylsma, and Cozzarelli, 1989). 
Studies  suggest  that  women  are  disproportionately  represented  in  lower  status  and  lower 
paying occupations in which there are less chances for advancement (Treiman and Hartmann, 
1981). This might make women expect to give more and get less from work organizations  
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than men do, hence, they might consider it fair to have the more efficient secretary paid equal 
to the other. An alternative explanation is that men and women may want different things 
from their work as existing evidence suggests that women are less likely than men to value 
money and more likely to value the intrinsic nature of work and expressive rewards at work 
(Nieva and Gutek, 1982).  
The competition variable is negative and significant. The variable is measured as scale 
variable with higher value meaning that a worker believes that competition is harmful. Our 
result suggest that as an employee becomes more inclined to believing that competition is 
good due to its ability to stimulate hard work and development of new ideas, the more likely 
he or she will prefer efficiency to equity wages. This is expected since competition rewards 
efficiency. We also find that employees who consider themselves religious as well as married 
respondents  are  more  likely  to  choose  efficiency  wages  over  equity  wages.  In  terms  of 
ethnicity; blacks, whites and Asians are all more likely to prefer equity wages than other 
races. 
At  individual  level,  high  income  earners  are  likely  to  prefer  efficiency  wages  over 
egalitarian  wages.  However,  respondents  from  high  GDP  countries  tend  to  prefer  equal 
horizontal wages. This might indicate that low income nations might be primarily focused on 
increasing economic growth and since efficiency and productivity are important determinants 
of economic growth then individuals are more concerned with efficiency wages.  
We find evidence that income inequality, individual income tax rates and unemployment 
negatively affect workers’ preferences for efficiency over equity wages. These results are 
confirmed in Table 5 below where we report the predicted probability that workers prefer 
efficiency  to  equity  wages  for  a  given  level  of  income  inequality,  income  tax  and 
unemployment respectively while holding the rest of the variables constant at their means. 
Table 5: Illustration of how the probability that workers prefer efficiency over equity wages 
changes with income inequality, income tax rates and unemployment 
Value (%) 
Probability (Efficiency wages=1) 
Gini coefficient  Individual Income Tax  Unemployment 
0  0.94  0.83  0.83 
25  0.87  0.81  0.76 
50  0.76  0.79  0.66 
75  0.60  0.78  0.56 
100  0.43  0.76  0.45  
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The  finding  that  the  higher  the  individual  income  taxes  a  country  has,  the  less  likely 
individuals  are  to  prefer  efficiency  over  equity  wages  could  be  capturing  the  fact  that  
increased taxes might reduce incentives for workers to exert more effort and in this case 
equity wages are preferred as they are independent of workers’ effort or job performance. 
The negative and significant impact  of income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) 
on workers’ preference for efficiency wages is expected since high inequality might increase 
employees’ desire for a more equal income society which translates into workers’ preferences 
for equal horizontal wages  that will reduce the inequality level in the country. The rate of 
unemployment is a crucial determinant of workers’ preferences for efficiency vis-à-vis equity 
wages. When unemployment rate is high, employees major concern is likely to be securing a 
job rather than indexing wages based on workers’ efficiency or performance. This is because 
the job market is tight and the probability of finding a job is low and accordingly having 
efficiency wages is not a priority. On the other hand when unemployment is low workers are 
likely to give priority on having wages based on performance and this translates into more 
preference for  efficiency  wages.  Moreover,  when  unemployment  rate  is  low  and  in  case 
workers  are  paid  equal  horizontal  wages  comparable  across  entities  regardless  of 
performance they will shirk since if caught and fired they can easily find another job (Carter, 
2005).  Our  results  strongly  confirm  this  hypothesis  as  it  depicts  a  negative  relationship 
between unemployment rate and workers’ preference for efficiency wages, conditional on 
other factors.  
4.  Conclusion 
Conventional  economic  theory  demonstrates  the  importance  of  labor  efficiency  for 
economic growth, implying that promoting labor efficiency is one way to achieve increased 
economic growth. Fundamental to promoting job efficiency is having an understanding of 
what  influences  individuals’  preferences  for  wage  structures  that  reward  efficiency. 
Information on what influences employees’ preferences for efficiency vis-à-vis equity wages 
is crucial in designing firms wage structures. This paper used the 2005 wave of the World 
Values  Survey  data  for  43  countries  to  examine  socio-economic  and  country-level 
characteristics that influence employees’ preferences for efficiency over equity wages.  
Our results underscore the importance of both socio-economic and country-level variables 
in  workers’  efficiency-equity  considerations.  In  particular  we  find  that  an  employee’s 
preference for efficiency wages increases with education and globalization while it decreases 
with unemployment, income inequality and income tax rates. This means that institutions and  
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specifically public policy that promote education and globalization, along with policies that 
reduce  unemployment could  be  used  to  promote  mechanisms  that  reward  job  efficiency, 
specifically to promote efficiency-based wages.  
However it is important to acknowledge that, although empirical evidence supports the 
importance of efficiency in economic growth, different countries or societies might place 
different relative importance of efficiency vis-à-vis equity. In some situations equity might be 
more  of  a  priority  to  policymakers.  Thus,  while  our  analysis  has  been  more  inclined  to 
examining the factors that make efficiency wages acceptable to workers, the results need to 
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